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Abstract: In empirical research on direct investments, Dunning's eclectic para- 
digm is widely accepted. While this paradigm serves as a theoretical basis for 
selecting possible explanatory variables, econometric specification usually is ad 
hoc. This paper shows the implications of the eclectic paradigm for the econo- 
metric estimation of investment determinants using firm-level data. The as- 
sumptions of the eclectic paradigm lead to a multiplicative model, which calls 
for a particular estimation strategy. In this way, the empirical analysis is coher- 
ently linked to the theoretical base. Furthermore, it becomes possible to sys- 
tematically test the assumptions of the eclectic paradigm. JEL no. F21, F23 
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1 Introduction 
While there is no generally accepted theory of foreign direct investment, 
various theoretical pproaches are available. The eclectic paradigm- also 
called Ownership-Location-Internalization pproach (OLI approach) - 
stems from Dunning (1981b) and has found wide use for the explana- 
tion of direct investments. According to this approach, a firm only makes 
direct investments when three conditions are simultaneously fulfilled. 
First, the firm must have a competitive advantage over foreign competi- 
tors in the form, for example, of a patent or a brand name (ownership 
advantages). Second, location advantages xist in the host country which 
make local production attractive (location advantages). Third, exploit- 
ing the competitive advantage within the firm itself must be superior 
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to marketing through licensing agreements (internalization advantages 
due to transaction cost). 
Existing empirical work on direct investment activity often uses 
the eclectic paradigm as a theoretical background. However, use of 
the theory is mostly limited to the selection of possible explanatory 
variables (cf. the overview in UNCTC 1992). Beyond this, economet- 
ric specification usually is rather ad hoc. There is a danger that the 
OLI approach is reduced to a "shopping list of variables" (Dunning 
1991), from which one can choose variables at will for explaining dir- 
ect investment. As this paper will show, the customary specification 
is not in accordance with the eclectic paradigm. Indeed, the choice of 
proper estimation strategy becomes a major issue, to be addressed in
this study. 
The goal of this paper is to clarify the implications of the eclectic 
paradigm. For this purpose, an empirical model is developed which 
shows important characteristics of the eclectic paradigm. The first step 
is to examine the international involvement of firms. Direct invest- 
ments, exporting or licensing are possible internationalization strate- 
gies. The choice between these three strategies depends on ownership, 
location, and internalization advantages. These three advantages are the 
cornerstone of the OLI approach and form the basis of the empirical 
model. 
Moreover, the eclectic paradigm can be used to guide the choice of 
functional form in econometric estimation and not only selection of 
explanatory variables. The procedure suggested in this study estimates 
the investment determinants in agreement with the OLI approach, thus 
closing the gap between theory and empirical analysis. 
This paper is structured as follows: The second part summarizes 
the core arguments of the eclectic paradigm. Next, the widely used 
procedure for estimating the investment determinants with the help of 
the OLI approach isdescribed. The fourth part presents he econometric 
estimation strategy designed to be in accordance with the OLI approach. 
These general results are completed by the examination ofa special case 
of the model in the fifth part. Using Swiss firm-level data, the proposed 
econometric approach is implemented mpirically in the sixth section. 
In the last part, the estimation strategy for identifying the determinants 
of direct investment is summarized, and possible future uses of the model 
are discussed. 
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2 Ownership-Location-Internalization Approach 
The eclectic or OLI approach stems from Dunning (198 l b, 1988, 1991, 
1993). According to this theory, three conditions have to be fulfilled 
for a firm to engage in direct investment: (1) the firm has ownership- 
specific advantages (O advantages), (2) there are internalization advan- 
tages (I advantages) involved, and (3) the foreign country has location 
advantages (L advantages). In the following, we shall examine these three 
conditions more closely. 
(1) The necessity for O advantages rests on the consideration that 
foreign firms are originally at a competitive disadvantage compared to 
local competitors. This results from its poorer knowledge of local con- 
ditions and from the costs arising from activity at a distance. Only when 
ownership-specific advantages compensate hese primary disadvantages 
is an involvement abroad considered at all. Patented technologies, estab- 
lished brand names, and the human capital of employees may be sources 
of O advantages. 
(2) However, an O advantage need not be exploited internally but 
may also be used externally, e.g. through licensing arrangements or
the sale of a patent. From this follows the second necessary condition 
for direct investment. The exploitation of the O advantage within the 
organization itself must be superior to its marketing, e.g. in the form 
of licensing. These so-called internalization (I) advantages occur when 
licensing is connected with high transaction costs because of insufficient 
protection of intellectual property. 
(3) Finally, location (L) advantages in the potential host country of 
direct investment are also necessary, otherwise the transfer of a value- 
adding activity is not worthwhile. The income from O advantages can 
also be realized through inland production followed by export. Con- 
sequently, a firm without L advantages will serve the foreign market 
through exports and not by means of local production. 
Table 1 summarizes the OLI approach. Only when all three condi- 
tions are simultaneously fulfilled is direct investment superior to the 
alternatives of exporting or licensing to a foreign firm. If, apart from O 
advantages, only I advantages xist, serving the foreign market by means 
of exports uggests itself. In contrast, when a firm has only O advantages 
at its disposal, it will choose licensing as the internationalization strategy. 
According to Dunning's concept, every successful operation in a foreign 
market requires O advantages. 
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Table 1: OLI Approach 
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Ownership Location Internalization 
advantages advantages advantages 
yes yes yes 
yes no yes 
yes no no 
Route of serving market 
Foreign direct investment 
Exports 
Contractual resource transfers 
Source: Dunning (1981a: 32). 
Within the framework of the OLI approach, the above-mentioned 
advantages are, according to Stehn (1992), necessary and sufficient for 
explaining all three internationalization strategies, i.e. exporting, licens- 
ing, and direct investment. Dunning (1981b) states that the impor- 
tance and configuration of the three advantages differ according to 
the country, industry and firm involved. For the empirical examin- 
ation of foreign activities, therefore, the following conclusion suggests 
itself: the probability of a direct investment is higher, the more own- 
ership advantages a firm possesses, the stronger the incentives are to 
exploit these internally as opposed to externally, and the more it is 
in its interest o make use of the O advantages from a foreign loca- 
tion. 
In the OLI approach, direct investment, exporting and licensing are 
alternatives for serving aforeign market. However, the L and I advantages 
lead to an "either/or" decision between the three internationalization 
strategies. According to the eclectic paradigm, a firm producing one 
single type of one good has no reason to be active in a market with more 
than one strategy. Thus, this approach cannot explain why such a firm 
would use several internationalization strategies in one foreign market. 
However, ifa firm produces different goods, the constellation of the O, L 
and I advantages may vary and different internationalization strategies 
may be optimal for different goods. 
This important characteristic is included in our model and has im- 
plications for the empirical analysis. According to the model, a firm 
is active in a certain market with no more than one strategy. In a re- 
alistic setting, however, there may well be firms using more than one 
internationalization strategy. In order to make the data compatible with 
the OLI model, the most important strategy could be chosen for these 
firms. 
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3 The Simple Logit and Probit Models as a Misspecification 
A logit or probit model in a way represents a natural starting point 
for estimating the determinants of investment using firm-level data. 1 
However, this procedure isnot in accord with the OLI approach. Let the 
binary dependent variable yj indicate whether f irmj is involved in direct 
investment or not. Various indicators of the O, L and I advantages serve 
as explanatory variables, resulting in the following equation: 
Y; = ~0 + Xlj~I "Or- X2j~2 -'~ ""-}-Xkj~k + 8j, (1) 
with)9 = 1 ifyj* > 0. 
Firm j is a direct investor if yj* is larger than zero. However, yf is not 
directly observable; it can be interpreted as the expected profit from dir- 
ect investment activity. If expected profit from foreign direct investment 
is positive and larger than from exporting or licensing, then the firm 
makes the investment and the binary variable yj takes on the value 1. 
Variables xl-xk symbolize the explanatory variables for the presence of 
O, L and I advantages in the firm j. 
The unsatisfactory aspect of ( 1 ) is that the three necessary conditions 
of the eclectic paradigm are additive. For example, missing I advantages 
can be compensated by pronounced O advantages, o that yj* is never- 
theless larger than zero, causing the firm to make direct investments. 
According to the OLI approach, however, the three advantages must 
be simultaneously present for direct investment. Using a logit or pro- 
bit model for estimating foreign direct investment is not suitable when 
the eclectic paradigm provides the theoretical basis. Therefore, another 
specification eeds to be developed. 
4 A Multiplicative Model for the OLI Approach 
Let voj stand for the ownership-specific advantages of firm j, vii for its 
internalization advantages, and vLj for its location advantages. These 
advantages apply to activity in a certain country or region. Location 
advantages in particular depend on the country selected. In order not to 
complicate the notation unnecessarily, the index for the potential target 
country has been omitted. 
1 Wagner and Schnabel (1994) for example chose this procedure. 
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Finally, advantages v.j represent conditions in the target country as 
they affect firm j. For example, the low labor costs in Eastern Europe 
provide an incentive for the transfer of production to that region. In 
principle, any foreign investor can make use of the low wage costs; how- 
ever, for firms with labor-intensive production, this location advantage 
of Eastern Europe takes on greater importance than for capital-intensive 
firms. 
The individual factors v.j can take on any value, but they are not 
directly observable. If voj is larger than zero, the firm has ownership- 
specific advantages. With a negative voj, the firm has not been successful 
in distancing itself rom competitors through an O advantage. A positive 
vi) points to internalization advantages. With a negative value, the mar- 
keting of the O advantage by means of licensing abroad is superior to 
internal exploitation. The variable VLj is defined analogously. If location 
advantages xist for a firm in the potential target country, then VLj is 
positive. 
With negative values for vii and vLj, one can speak of I or L disad- 
vantages. In contrast, a negative Voj is not to be taken as a competitive 
disadvantage, since such a firm would disappear f om the market. In his 
model, Stehn (1992) starts from the assumption that the variable for the 
O advantages is limited to positive values. This restriction is neglected 
in the following in order to be able to assume the normal distribution 
for the error term. A strongly negative value for Voj is to be interpreted 
to the effect hat the firm is far from achieving an ownership-specific 
advantage. 
Let us now assume that the three factors Voj, Vlj and VLj can be 
described as linear functions: 
Voj = Xo~3o + ~oj, (2) 
Vlj = xijj6i ~- ~ij, (3) 
vLj = xr~& + ~L). (4) 
The vector Xoj contains the variables that have an influence on the pres- 
ence of ownership-specific advantages. Furthermore, rio represents he 
vector of parameters and eoj the error term. The formulation of (2), (3) 
and (4) mirrors the assumption that the presence of individual advan- 
tages can be explained by various independent variables. For example, 
a firm with high research and development expenditure or numerous 
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patents (Xoj large) is ceteris paribus more likely to have ownership- 
specific advantages. 
In order to record the international ctivity of a firm j, the following 
variables are defined: 
0 
Y~J = {{1 
0 
1 
Yzj 
0 
1 
YKj ---- 0 
if the firm j is active internationally b way of 
direct investment 
otherwise 
if the firm j is active internationally b way of 
exporting 
otherwise 
if the firm j is active internationally b way of 
licensing 
otherwise 
if the firm j is not internationally active at all 
otherwise. 
The internationalization strategies refer to a certain country or re- 
gion. We assume here that a firm produces only one good. In this case, 
as argued in Section 2, the OLI approach predicts that only one interna- 
tionalization strategy isefficient for a firm. Therefore, precisely one of 
the four variables should equal one for firmj. Indeed, the OLI approach 
imposes the following restrictions, which derive directly from Table 1:2 
Yo j= 1 if Vo j>O and v~j>O and VLj>0; 
yej = l if Vo) > O and vt) > O and Vaj <~ O; 
Yzj = 1 if Voj > O and vij <. O and VLj <~ O; 
YKj= 1 if Voy<~O. 
2 If there are O and L advantages, but no I advantages (voj > 0 and vtj < 0 and 
vLj > 0), the OLI approach says nothing about the optimal internationalization strat- 
egy. This case is therefore not defined in the model. By slight modification of the 
model this can be rectified, whereby then the local factors only influence the choice 
between export activities and direct investment. If O advantages but no I advantages 
are present, the foreign market will he worked by licensing in every case. As the model 
should show the OLI approach in its original form, we have omitted this assumption. 
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Regarding the error terms Soj, e~j and e O, a trivariate normal distri- 
bution is assumed: 
/ * ' ; / -  N , f io,  1 L 9 
\ so ] \pot fi~t PlI 
Let F(.) be the distribution function of this normal distribution and 
q~ (.) the distribution function of the one-dimensional standard normal 
distribution. Then, the probabilities of firm j being direct investor, ex- 
porter, licenser or a firm without international activity are, respectively, 
Pr(YDj = 1) = 
Pr(y O = 1) = 
Pr(yzj = 1) = 
Pr(yKj = 1) = 
Pr(voj > 0 and vlj > 0 and VLj > O) 
-= F(xojflo, xIjfll, XLjflL; 1001, POE, fIL); 
Pr(voj > 0 and vi) > 0 and VLj ~ O) 
~- F(xojflO, Xljfil, --XLjflL; POI, --PoL, --fIL); 
Pr(vo) > 0 and v 0 <~ 0 and vLj <~ O) 
= F(xojflo, --Xljfil, --XLjfiL; --fiOl, --DOt, flL); 
Pr(vo) ~< O) = O(-Xojfio). 
The expression yKj = 1 follows from the fact that a sub-vector of 
a normally distributed vector is normally distributed as well. Then, the 
log-likelihood function for n firms is given by 
L(flo, ~I, ~L, POl, IDOL, filL) 
= L (yDjln{F(Xojflo, Xljflt, XLjfiL; foI, POL, fiIL)] 
j=l 
+ y~l .  [F(~oj,~o, x~j~,, -x,~j,8~; fiOl, -fio~,-fit~)] 
+ yz;~n [F(xo~o,-x,,6,, -x~; -fiOl,-fio~, fi,L)] 
+ y~:j ln [ cb ( -  Xoj fl o ) ] ) . 
(5) 
The log-likelihood function (5) represents the starting point for esti- 
mation. Maximization of this function allows the parameters of interest 
flo, flI, ilL, t90I, POE and PIE to be estimated. The formulation of(5) takes 
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into consideration the assumption that for direct investment to occur, 
both O and L and I advantages must exist. 
Interdependence of O, L and I Types of Advantage 
There is mutual interdependence between the three types of advantages. 
The locational conditions in a country can, for example, influence not 
only the ownership-specific advantages ofa firm but also its ability to in- 
ternalize its competitive advantage. It is sometimes claimed that the OLI 
approach creates the wrong impression in viewing the three advantages 
as independent of each other (Dunning 1991). In the following, two 
kinds of interdependence between O, L and I advantages are admitted. 
First, all three advantages may depend on the same factors, since the 
vectors Xoj, Xlj and xLj overlap to some extent. The same variable, then, 
explains the O as well as the I and L advantages. 
Second, the three necessary conditions for direct investment may be 
interdependent through the correlation of the error terms. A positive 
correlation between the error terms eoj and e/j means, for example, that 
firms which have an ownership-specific advantage by chance are also 
more likely to exploit his internally, than would be predicted based on 
systematic factors. 
From the theoretical viewpoint, neither the sign nor the size of these 
correlation coefficients can be predicted with great confidence. However, 
the following argument speaks in favor of a positive correlation between 
Eoj and EIi. For technical reasons, the 0 equation above includes all 
explanatory variables that are easily observed and measured. For ex- 
ample, some empirical papers use the number of patents registered or 
the introduction of new products. Patents enjoy a relatively good deal 
of protection, making their exploitation by licensing possible. In con- 
trast, the efficient organizational structure of a firm (e.g. non-codifiable 
knowledge that can also lead to 0 advantages) usually is not measured, 
causing it to be reflected in the error term. However, these 0 advantages 
can only be exploited internally as a rule. Firms with these 0 advantages, 
therefore, also have a positive error term in the I equation, resulting in 
a positive correlation between the 0 and I error terms. 
In view of limited theoretical knowledge, the interdependence be-
tween error terms becomes an empirical issue. The assumption of inde- 
pendent error terms implifies the model. For each of the three variables 
Soj, eij and eq, a one-dimensional standard normal distribution applies 
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in this case. The log-likelihood function then becomes 
L(eo, e,,eL) = #. (yD, l.[*(Xo, eo)] + yD, ln [~(x,,e0] 
j=l 
+ YDj In [Cl)(xLjJ~L)] ~- YEj In [(/~ (xoj/~o) ] 
+ yEjln[q)(x,jfl,)]+yejln[~(-xoflt)] (6) 
+ Yzi ln[q~(Xojflo)] + yzjln[ab(-xtiflt)] 
+ xzj I, [~ (-xL~e~)] + x~ In [~ (-~o, eo)] ). 
Rearranging terms, one gets the following log-likelihood function: 
L(~o, ~, ~) 
= ~((>~+y~+yz,)ln[~(Xoj~ol]+Y~ln[~(-Xo,~o)] 
j=l 
+ (yDj + y~j) ln [cl)(x,)fl,) ] + yzj ln [cl)(--x,j,8,) ] (7) 
+ YDj In [~(xoflL)] + (YE/+ Yzj)In [~(--XLjflL)] ). 
In each of the three lines of(7) only one vector of parameters appears. 
A separate maximization of the three lines leads to the maximization 
of (7). The first line yields an estimate for rio, the second for flI, and the 
third for ilL, derived from a binary probit model. The first probit esti- 
mation determines the parameters of the O advantages, in which firms 
with international ctivity of any kind are coded with one and all others 
with zero. 3 The two other probit estimations only take into considera- 
tion firms with international ctivity. For the estimation ofI advanlages, 
firms which serve the foreign market with direct investmems orexports 
make up one category of the dependent variable, while licensers belong 
to the other category. In the determination f L advantages, finally, direct 
investors erve as the benchmark for exporters and licensers. 
5 Multiplicative Model with Partial Observability 
In line with (5) and (7), the estimation of determinants of direct invest- 
ment requires - apart from details of the direct investments of a firm - 
3 Meyer (1998) chose this procedure for estimation of the 0 advantages. 
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information on exports and licensing as well. Often this additional infor- 
mation is not available, as the data come from surveys that concentrate 
exclusively on direct investment activities. It is merely known whether 
a respondent made direct investments ornot. The logit or probit estima- 
tion described in the second section is also based on information about 
direct investment activities only. 
This section investigates the consequences of this limited data avail- 
ability. Among the four variables YDj, Ysj, YZj and Yxi of the preceding 
section onlyyDj is observed. Ifa firm is a direct investor, according to the 
OLI paradigm it has the three types of advantage. If it does not report 
direct investments, atleast one of the three types must be lacking. With 
this information the following distribution for yDj can be derived: 
Pr(yDj = 1) = (Voj > 0 and vii > 0 and vtj > O) 
= F(xoj~o, xij~l, XLjJ~L; POI, fOOL, lOlL); 
Pr(yDj = 0) = (Voj <~ 0 or vtj <~ 0 or VLj <. O) 
= l -- F(Xoj3o, x03I, XLj3L; POI, PO> PID. 
On the basis of the distribution ofyDj, the log-likelihood function is 
L(flo, ill, ilL, POI, POL, PlL) 
= p,L)] (8) 
j=l 
+ (1 - >3  In [1 - F( oj o,  ij i,  Lj L; poe, Po , 
If the three error terms are independent of each other, then the 
log-likelihood function becomes 
L(t~O, t~I,I~L) = ~-~. (YDjll'I [(]-)(Xojt~O)(]-)(XljJ~I)~J)(XLjJ~L)] (9) 
j=l 
+ (1 - YDj)In [1 - ~(xoj30)~(Xo3I)~(XLj3L )]). 
Maximization of (8) or (9) results in estimates for the three parameter 
vectors. Despite partial observability, it is thus theoretically possible to 
estimate the determinants of direct investment. When comparing (8) and 
(9) with the probit model in the second section, differences appear. The 
OLI approach imposes restrictions in the functional form, disallowing 
substitution between the three advantages. 
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This formulation derives from the bivariate probit model with par- 
tial observability, which is a combination of two probit models. The two 
binary dependent variables describe four possible vents, of which only 
one is observed (Poirier 1980; Meng and Schmidt 1985). 4It is not pos- 
sible to differentiate between the remaining three events. The OLI model 
of (8) and (9) represents an extension of the bivariate probit model with 
partial observability oaccommodate hree decision variables. There are 
three probit models with eight possible events of which seven cannot 
be differentiated. Correspondingly, one can speak of a trivariate probit 
model with partial observability. 
The estimation of a bivariate probit model with partial observability 
is inefficient in comparison to the results obtained with complete infor- 
mation, that is, when all four possible conditions of the two dependent 
variables are identifiable (Poirier 1980). This lack of efficiency in estima- 
tion represents he cost of partial observability. According to Meng and 
Schmidt (1985), this cost is high. The estimation of investment deter- 
minants on the basis of information about direct investment, exporting, 
and licensing is, therefore, more efficient han the maximization of (8). 
Furthermore, in the trivariate model, the efficiency loss could be even 
larger than in the bivariate probit model. Thus, the procedure suggested 
in the fourth section is preferable to the one described here. 
6 Empirical Findings 
In this section, we implement the proposed econometric approach em- 
pirically. We use the data from a representative survey of the Swiss 
Institute for Business Cycle Research on the activities of Swiss firms in 
Eastern Europe. 5This survey was carried out in 1997. The data set com- 
prises 297 firms from the secondary sector. The firms had to assess the 
importance of Eastern Europe as an export market, as a licensee and as 
a location for direct investments. We therefore have details of all three 
internationalization strategies available. 
According to Dunning's OLI approach, each firm pursues at most one 
internationalization strategy for one single type of good. This character- 
4 As each variable takes the value 0 or l, the following four events are possible: (0,0), 
(0,1), (1,0) and (1,1). Normally, the three vents (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0) cannot be dif- 
ferentiated. 
5 For information on the survey, cf. Hollenstein and Lenz (i998). 
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istic is built into in the empirical model. Some of the firms questioned 
in the survey, however, utilized several forms to supply the Eastern Eu- 
ropean market. For the implementation f the econometric approach, 
only one strategy can be optimal for each firm. The firms assess the 
importance of the individual strategies using a five-step scale. For the 
estimation of the investment determinants, we assume that the strategy 
with the greatest importance for the firm is the optimal one. 
On the basis of the available data, a clear classification ispossible for 
288 firms. Of these 288 companies, 180 (62.5 percent) put no importance 
on any of the three activities. For 22 (7 percent) licensing is to the 
fore. About a quarter put export into the highest category (73 firms), 
and 4.5 percent gave direct investment activities (13 firms) the most 
importance. 
6.1 Explanatory Variables 
Various variables are used to explain the three advantages. These vari- 
ables are represented by Xoj, xij and xLy. First we deal with the factor of 
influence for ownership-specific competitive advantages, then the inter- 
nalization advantages and finally the location advantages. Table A. 1 in 
the Annex contains an exact definition of the variables used as well as 
the mean and standard eviation. 
Ownership advantages: 0 advantages can be based on technological su- 
periority. The attainment and securing of technological superiority is 
usually connected with corresponding expenses for research and de- 
velopment. The companies questioned assessed the expenses paid for 
research and development on a five-step scale from "none" to "very 
high". Based on theoretical considerations, the hypothesis i that firms 
with high research and development expenditure are more likely to have 
O advantages attheir disposal. 
The data set shows whether the firm has introduced products which 
are new worldwide in their sector during the past three years. According 
to the theoretical expectations, the capacity to introduce new products 
is positively linked with the presence of O advantages. 
In the estimation of ownership-specific advantages, a dummy vari- 
able is adopted which shows the status of the company. Legally in- 
dependent subsidiaries are given the value one. Firms without a legal 
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connection with other companies and parent companies take the value 
zero. Subsidiaries can profit from the ownership-specific advantages of
the parent company without having these themselves. 
Large enterprises have ownership-specific advantages at their dis- 
posal due to the fixed-cost character of many activities which are con- 
nected with international involvement. To measure the size of an enter- 
prise, we use the number of employees. In order to show a non-linear 
relationship, the number of employees i also squared in the estima- 
tion. In general, the relationship between the number of employees 
and ownership-specific advantages is assumed to follow an inverted "u" 
course. This leads us to expect a positive sign for the linear term and 
a negative sign for the squared term. 
Internalization advantages: While there are a number of indicators which 
suggest themselves from the theoretical viewpoint for ownership-specific 
advantages, for the internalization advantages it is far more difficult to 
find the corresponding explanatory variables. In this connection John 
H. Dunning writes: "It is when one comes to pinpointing operationally 
testable proxies for internalisation advantages one runs into difficulties. 
This is [...] because the various forms of market failure and/or admin- 
istrative fiat are extremely difficult to quantify [...]" (Dunning 1981a: 
50). The indicators used here to explain the internalization advantages 
attempt to measure the transaction costs of external exploitation of O 
advantages. 
Internalization advantages are present when an enterprise has owner- 
ship-specific advantages at its disposal, but cannot secure them by ap- 
propriate patent rights. The introduction of products which are new 
worldwide is a possible cause of ownership-specific advantages. The in- 
novation behind such new products may, under certain circumstances, 
be protected by a patent. In this case, nothing stands in the way of ex- 
ploiting the O advantages through the market. If the innovation does not 
enjoy patent protection, problems concerning asymmetric nformation 
and the unauthorized transmission of knowledge may arise. Internal 
exploitation is therefore superior to the external one. On the basis of 
the information about patent applications and the introduction of new 
products, an indicator for the presence of internalization advantages 
can be determined. If the company has introduced new products but 
not applied for patent, problems with the external exploitation of the 
O advantages will result due to inadequate protection. Internalization 
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advantages xist. The variable "new products without patent" then takes 
the value one. 
The firms questioned had to assess various mechanisms a to their 
effectivity for securing innovation-specific competitive advantages. The 
assessment followed afive-step scale from "not effective" to "very effect- 
ive." The mechanisms to be assessed were, among other things, patent 
rights as well as secrecy. The transaction costs of external exploitation 
of O advantages depend on the effectivity of the various mechanisms 
for securing innovation-specific competitive advantages. The corres- 
ponding information forms a direct indicator for the possibilities and 
problems relating to the sale of O advantages. Where patent rights ef- 
fectively secure the innovation-specific competitive advantages, they 
can be exploited by means of license agreements and there are no in- 
ternalization advantages. On the other hand, where secrecy forms the 
effective mechanism for protecting know-how, there is a tendency for 
internalization advantages to exist, as by marketing the O advantages 
secrecy can hardly be guaranteed - even with corresponding agree- 
ments. 
As a further factor of influence for internalization advantages, we use 
the degree of diversification ofthe firm. Diversified firms have detailed 
knowledge about he market of a certain country in which they produce 
and sell a wide range of products. The wider knowledge of diversified 
firms permits asimpler solution to the problems connected with foreign 
investment. A company which is already used to running various product 
lines will probably find it easier to organize production and marketing in
a foreign country. Correspondingly they may prefer internal exploitation 
of the competitive advantages. 
Location advantages: As the firms form the unit of analysis, the location 
advantages should be examined with regard to the consequences forthe 
individual firm. A certain location factor can be of varying importance 
to different firms. The central question here concerns the characteristics 
of firms which find location advantages in Eastern Europe. 
Eastern Europe is characterized bylow labor costs. For labor-intensive 
firms, the low labor costs represent an important location factor. The 
labor intensity ismeasured by the number of employees per SFr 100,000 
turnover. A high value for this variable reflects high labor intensity. The 
hypothesis  that labor-intensive firms are more likely to have location 
advantages in Eastern Europe. 
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The importance oflow labor costs for a firm also depends on the qual- 
ification structure of the employees, whereby the possibility of a trans- 
fer to Eastern Europe exists mostly for activities requiring semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers. Firms with a high portion of semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers use relatively simple production technologies which 
make a transfer easy. Eastern Europe with its low labor costs offers these 
firms attractive location conditions. As no other information isavailable, 
we shall use the mean for the industry. This variable reflects the average 
percentage ofsemi-skilled and unskilled workers in the total work force 
of the industry. 
As a further explanatory factor for the estimation of L advantages, 
we shall use the portion of academics in the work force. Switzerland, as 
a highly developed industrial country, is relatively well endowed with 
well-trained employees. Companies which employ a great number of 
academics have comparative advantages in the location of Switzerland. 
This argumentation appears to favor a negative relationship between the 
percentage ofacademics and the location advantages in Eastern Europe. 
Again, there is no firm-specific information regarding the percentage 
of academics in the total work force, only the mean for the industry is 
available. 
For firms with technology-intensive production there is a tendency 
towards location advantages in Switzerland, as Switzerland is relatively 
well endowed with resources for research and development. Further- 
more, there is less necessity for these firms to search for location ad- 
vantages to reduce costs. Technology-intensive firms are less dependent 
on the exploitation of the lower labor costs in Eastern Europe. As an 
indicator of technology-intensive production, we shall use the variable 
patent, which takes the value one if the firm applied for a patent in the 
past three years. The size of the firm is adopted as a control variable in 
the estimation of L advantages. 
6.2 Econometric Method 
The log-likelihood function (5) is the most general formulation of the 
proposed econometric framework and is therefore the starting point for 
the estimation. However, the normal distribution of the error terms in 
the three quations i three-dimensional. As the maximization ofa likeli- 
hood function with three-dimensional ormal distribution isvery com- 
plex and cannot, for example, be carried out by the usual computer pro- 
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grammes like LIMDER we slightly modify the method. The estimation is 
made by three bivariate probit models, whereby two of the three advan- 
tages are to be found in each model. With each bivariate probit model, 
therefore, the correlation between two error terms can be estimated. 
In the first bivariate probit model, the equations for ownership- 
specific advantages and internalization advantages are dealt with sim- 
ultaneously. Internalization advantages are only present if ownership- 
specific advantages are available to the firm. Thus, here we are dealing 
with a bivariate probit model with sample selection (see Greene 1998: 
492; 2000: 857). In this model the data of one dependent variable are 
only observable when the other dependent variable takes the value one.  
The simultaneous estimation of ownership-specific advantages and lo- 
cation advantages is also performed within the framework of a bivari- 
ate probit model with sample selection, as the information regarding 
L advantages i only available for firms which have an ownership- 
specific advantage and are therefore internationally active. The third 
bivariate probit model includes the internalization and location com- 
parison. Contrary to the two previous models, there is no selection 
here. 6
6.3 Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the three estimations. First of all, 
we shall look at the estimated correlation coefficient between the error 
terms, which are printed in the third from last line of Table 2. None 
of the three estimated correlations i significant. We can, therefore, 
not reject the hypothesis that the three error terms are independent. 
However, when generalizing the results obtained here, it must be taken 
into consideration that the estimated standard errors are relatively large 
due to the limited size of the sample. A larger number of observations 
6 On the basis of the OLI approach (see Table 1) the following coding for the de- 
pendent variables results for the three bivariate probit models. For the O advantages, 
firms which are active internationally, whether through direct investment, export or 
licensing, form one category of dependent variables, and firms without international 
involvement the other. Internalization advantages exist for firms which assess exports 
or direct investment as the most important strategy. These two forms of international 
involvement form one category of dependent variables. The other category consists of 
companies which deal with the Eastern European market by means of licensing. For 
the location advantages, firms which regard direct investment as the most important 
strategy are compared with the group of exporters and licensees. 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B SE B SE B SE 
0 Equatzon 
R&D expenditure (+) 0.219 ** 0.093 0.167 * 0,090 
New products (+) 0.397 * 0.205 0.379 * 0.198 
Subsidiary (+) 0,501 *** 0.192 0.319 * 0.192 
Employees (+) 0.115 ** 0,047 0.171 ** 0,081 
Employees, squared ( - )  0.185 ** 0.080 -0.401 0.776 
Constant -1.274 *** 0.239 -1.179 *** 0.225 
I Equation 
New products w/o pat, (+) 0.748 0,462 0.563 0,424 
Effectivity 
-Patent rights ( - )  0.508 ** 0,227 0.423 * 0.238 
Secrecy (+) -0.593 *** 0.222 -0.590 ** 0.231 
Diversification (+) 1,003 * 0.571 1.079 * 0.621 
Constant 0.438 0.979 0.587 0,862 
L Equation 
Labor intensity (+) -3.185 * 1.928 -3.310 2.026 
Semi- and unskilled (+) -0.027 * 0.022 -0.025 0.023 
Academics ( - )  -0.179 0.148 -0.188 0.157 
Patent ( - )  -1,131 * 0.601 -1.277 ** 0.618 
Employees (?) 0.131 0.089 0.108 0,085 
Constant 1.257 2.203 1,719 1.732 
Correlation of error terms 0.123 0.539 0.401 0.973 0,707 0.940 
Observations 246 262 90 
Log-likelihood function - 178.80 - 176.91 -56.82 
Note: For the definition of the variables, see Table A.1. The expected sign is in parentheses. 
B = Estimated coefficient. SE = Standard error. * p ~ 0.1, ** p ~< 0.05, *** p ~ 0.01. 
could lead to a reduction in the estimated standard error and, in certain 
circumstances, to different conclusions. 
Let us now turn to the influence of the various explanatory variables 
on the three advantages. The procedure chosen with three bivariate pro- 
bit models means that for each equation two estimations exist. However, 
the differences between the two estimations are small, so the results ob- 
tained can, therefore, be regarded as relatively stable. With regard to O 
advantages, the results are very encouraging. The estimated coefficients 
are largely significant and show the expected sign. The results can be 
interpreted as confirmation of this part of the OLI approach. 
On the other hand, the results regarding the I and L equations are 
unsatisfactory. Some of the variables show a sign which is contrary to 
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theoretical expectations. Various alternative specifications ofthe estima- 
tion equation for I advantages do not lead to other results. The positive 
influence of the effectivity of patent rights and the negative ffect of 
secrecy are stable. The inconsistency with the theoretical expectations 
remains. As the two variables directly measure the transaction costs of 
external exploitation of O advantages, from a theoretical viewpoint they 
appear to be a convincing construct for capturing the idea of internal- 
ization. 
With the results of the L equation, one must consider that the vari- 
ables used have certain shortcomings. For labor intensity only turnover 
data are available and not value-added ata, and with the qualifica- 
tion structure of the work force, we have to fall back on the mean for 
the industry. The unsatisfactory esults could, however, also be due to 
a faulty theoretical basis. The assumption of the OLI approach that the 
location advantages delimit direct investment from the other forms of 
international ctivity, is therefore to be questioned. 
6.4 Interpretation 
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from this first im- 
plementation of the proposed econometric framework for the eclectic 
paradigm. In the most general formulation of the model, we assumed 
a three-dimensional ormal distribution for the three error terms. How- 
ever, from the theoretical viewpoint, there are no conclusive arguments 
for a link between the error terms. The empirical results are in harmony 
with this assumption. No significant value can be proved for any of the 
three correlation coefficients. The more special formulation of the model 
in equation (7), which begins with the assumption that error terms are 
independent, can therefore serve as a starting point. The empirical im- 
plementation f this approach isconsiderably simpler, as the explanatory 
variables of O, L and I advantages can be determined independently from 
each other. The estimation with this approach (results not presented) 
leads to only slightly different results for the data used here. 
The O advantages are explained by variables which are in accordance 
with the theoretical considerations. Therefore, the empirical results up- 
port this part of the OLI approach. Common O advantages influence 
all three forms of international ctivity. The conclusions from the esti- 
mation of internalization and location advantages are less clear. In the 
interpretation, one must take into consideration that this is the first 
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attempt to bring together various new variables to explain the inter- 
nalization advantages. Further esearch based on a more extensive data 
set will bring more clarity. Even taking the insufficient data into con- 
sideration, the estimation of location advantages tends to speak against 
the OLI approach. According to our results, location factors scarcely 
influence the decision between export and direct investment. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
This study develops an empirical model for the international ctivity of 
a firm on the basis of the eclectic paradigm developed by Dunning to 
explain direct investment. For this to occur, the firm must simultaneously 
have ownership (O), location (L), and internalization (I) advantages. 
The OLI approach suggests the following strategy for the econometric 
estimation of direct investment determinants u ing firm-level data: The 
log-likelihood function (5) is the most general formulation of the model, 
representing the starting point for estimation. Maximization of this 
function determines the set of explanatory variables of the three types 
of advantage. Any variable which favors the presence of one of the three 
conditions increases the probability of a direct investment. 
The general model also suggests correlations between the error terms 
of the three equations. Should the three error terms be uncorrelated, the 
simplified estimation according to (7) is more efficient. The determi- 
nants of international ctivity can, then, be estimated by means of three 
binary probit models. 
As the eclectic paradigm also specifies conditions for export activity 
and licensing, an efficient estimation of the three types of advantage r - 
quires details of the corresponding activity. Failing this information, the 
suggestion is to use a trivariate probit model with partial observability. 
The proposed model specification can be usefully employed in four 
areas. First, the model allows estimation of investment determinants in 
agreement with the eclectic paradigm. Thus, the theoretical pproach 
serves not only in the choice of explanatory variables, but also guides 
econometric specification. The theoretical nd the empirical analysis are 
linked together in this way. 
Second, in contrast to the additive model where a explanatory vari- 
able cannot be assigned to one of the three types of advantage, the multi- 
plicative model required by the OLI approach allows these variables to be 
grouped into the three categories. Making the direct investment decision 
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dependent on three conditions which must be fulfilled simultaneously is 
therefore not only a theoretical construct but obtains empirical content 
in this way. 
The third area of application results from the estimation of the 
correlation between the error terms. With regard to the interdependence 
between the O, L and I advantages, there is a need for explanation both 
on the theoretical nd the empirical level. The results of the estimation 
can contribute to a better understanding of the eclectic paradigm. In 
a first implementation f the econometric framework with data on the 
activities of Swiss industrial firms in Eastern Europe, the correlations 
between the error terms are not significantly different from zero. These 
empirical results lead to the conclusion that the error terms of the three 
advantages are independent ofeach other. 
Fourth, consistent modelling of the OLI paradigm makes empirical 
testing possible. Despite widespread use of the OLI approach, there have 
been no tests to this date that go beyond scanning the list of regres- 
sors in the light of the OLI approach (Dunning 1993). Using the model 
developed here, the assumptions ofthe OLI approach can be systemati- 
cally tested. The estimations presented in this paper show encouraging 
results and provide interesting indications for further research - both 
on the theoretical nd empirical level. Within the framework of the OLI 
approach, the O advantages are responsible for whether a firm is interna- 
tionally active at all or not. It was possible to estimate this first decision 
very well. The variables which explain the O advantages are in agreement 
with the theoretical expectations. Indirectly this can be interpreted as 
confirmation of this part of the OLI approach. 
According to the OLI approach, the L and I advantages are respon- 
sible in the second phase for the choice between the different interna- 
tionalization strategies. The estimation of this second phase produced 
unsatisfactory esults in the empirical implementation. There are two 
possible explanations for this finding. First, the cause could lie in the 
shortcomings of the explanatory variables used. With better data sets, 
a satisfactory estimation on the second phase should be successful. Sec- 
ond, there is also a possibility that this deficiency is due to false as- 
sumptions in the theoretical pproach which we took as a basis. Other 
data sets would then not lead to satisfactory estimations either. This 
could be an indication of the fact that this second phase of the OLI 
approach cannot be confirmed empirically and should be modified ac- 
cordingly. Further empirical analyses with different data sets and based 
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on the proposed econometric framework would contribute to further 
clarification. 
Appendix 
Table A. 1: Description of the Independent Variables 
Variable Definition Mean a Std dev. 
R&D expenditure Expenditure for research and devel- 2.336 1.092 
opment for the innovations, five-step 
scale from "none" (1) to "very high" 
(5) 
Products introduced which for the sec- 0.282 0.451 
tor are new worldwide (yes - 1, no - 
0) 
Legally independent subsidiary (1), 
otherwise (0) 
Number of employees divided by 100 
New products 
Subsidiary 0.301 
Employees 2.276 
Employees, squared Divided by 1,000,000 0.395 
New products - 1: new product with patent 0.156 b
without patent 0: no new product introduced 0.718 b
1: new product without patent 0.126 b
Effectivity 
- Patent rights 
- Secrecy 
Diversification 
Labor intensity 
Semi- and unskilled 
Academics 
Patent 
0.459 
5.866 
3.063 
Assessment of the effectivity of patent 2.276 1.142 
rights to secure innovation-specific 
competitive advantages, five-step scale 
from "not effective" (1) to "very effec- 
tive" (5) 
Assessment of the effectivity of secrecy 2.625 1.168 
to secure innovation-specific compet- 
itive advantages, five-step scale from 
"not effective" (1) to "very effec- 
tive" (5) 
Number of product areas in which the 1.095 0.550 
firm is active 
Number of employees per SFr 100,000 0.567 0.347 
turnover 
Percentage of semi- and unskilled in 39.258 15.329 
the total work force (in percent), sector 
mean 
Percentage of academics in the total 3.018 3.889 
work force (in percent), sector mean 
Patent applications (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.296 0.457 
a The sample contains 297 firms. According to the variable, the calculation of the mean and of the 
standard eviation is based on a slightly smaller number due to missing values. - b Percentage of 
firms in this category. 
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